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ABSTRACT 
There are many examples of markets where resources that were allocated ex-ante must be 
rationed ex-post. Two alternative methods of rationing are considered in this paper: priority service 
(see Chao and Wilson [1987] and Wilson [1989]) and proportional rationing (see Spulber [1989]). 
An experimental environment is developed in which the two rules are implemented within two well 
known institutions, the English and the Uniform Price sealed bid Auctions, under two different infor­
mation conditions. We find that priority service generates more efficient alloctions than proportional 
rationing, the sealed bid auction performed better than the English and that that both mechanisms 
and rationing rules were more efficient when there was a lack of common information. 
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ALLOCATING PRIORITY WITH AUCTIONS: AN EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Charles Noussair and David Porter 
There are many environments in which the realized delivery of resources may fall short of 
planned levels. In addition, supply cannot always be readily adjusted to compensate for these shor­
tages or respond to excess demand in the shortrun. Therefore, resources that were planned for use ex 
ante, will need to be rationed ex post. In this paper, we investigate various mechanisms, which have 
been proposed as methods for the efficient ex-ante and ex-post allocation of resources, when supply 
(or demand) is stochastic. Specifically, we examine the use of auctions to allocate contracts derived 
from two different ex-post rationing rules. 
Examples of environments under which ex post rationing could be useful are abundant. A 
widely cited example of such an environment is the market for electric power. Generally, there is a 
single supplier, (usually a regulated utility) who has a fixed maximal capacity, which can be supplied 
over a planning horizon. This capacity and its related flow are subject to unintended interruptions; 
e.g., equipment failures. In addition, there is a peak-load problem; a surge in demand at certain
times of the day or year in excess of the utility's capacity. Another example which has motivated 
our investigation is the allocation problem associated with NASA's planned Space Station. The Sta-
tion is to be a complex of potentially valuable resources, (e.g., electric power, pressurized volume, 
crew) demanded by scientific payloads. The Station will be subject to technical failures leading to 
unplanned interruptions. For example, if the Shuttle misses a launch date, there may be shortfalls in 
the supply of services. The Station's management is currently developing contingent planning poli­
cies to help prioritize payloads and usage. In the past, NASA has relied on user committees and
administrative dicta to control users. However, considering the number and diversity of users 
intending to use the station, a more responsive system will be required if efficiency is to be achieved.
At first glance this would seem to be no more than a typical allocation problem. One could 
just wait for the actual supply and demand conditions to be revealed and then run a spot market to 
price and allocate use. (Vickery [1971] and Bohn et al. [1983] have advocated the use of more spot 
markets in the allocation of electric power resources by opening up the power grid to competition). 
Under this type of market organization, however, if demanders desire to be able to plan in advance 
for their production, they must correctly anticipate spot prices and supplies. Alternatively, the use of 
complete contingent contracts, i.e., a contract contingent on every possible state of the world in an 
Arrow-Debreu model, can assist in providing information (forward markets) during production plan­
ning. However, the verification cost and number of such contracts can be prohibitive. An alternative 
contingent contracting system which requires fewer contracts is priority service. This form of con­
tract has been investigated by Chao and Wilson [1987], and Wilson [1989]. Using these contracts as 
a rationing device, suppliers service customers in descending order of priority until supply is 
exhausted. 
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Harris and Raviv [1981] were the first to suggest the use of nonuniform pricing schedules 
based on demander types and distributions so that a monopolist could segment the market and 
enhance revenues. Their model assumes fixed supply and single unit demands drawn from a fixed 
and common distribution. Chao and Wilson [1987] devise a price schedule based on priority class 
designations to induce demanders to self select into an efficient ranking. Priority classes are grada­
tions of reliability of service. The prices for each class are based on the (assumed known) distribu­
tion of demander types from which each demander draws his demand (in this model demands are 
also for single units). They show that most of the efficiency gains in that environment can be 
obtained from a small number of priority classes. Notice that in this model with single unit demands, 
when a unit is rationed (not supplied), rationing by demander and by unit are equivalent. This 
equivalence no longer holds if demands are for more than one unit. Recently, Spulber [1989] has 
investigated another rationing rule for allocating resources ex post. The rule he suggests is called 
proportional rationing. In this scheme, either maximum, minimum, or average demands are allo­
cated to individuals ex ante. Later, these are scaled up or down proportionally based on the supply 
that actually occurs. The scaling factor is the same for all demanders. This scheme rations units 
from demanders and not the entire demand of an individual, i.e., units not demanders have "priority". 
Thus if buyers' demands are for more than one unit, then proportional rationing can, on average, 
achieve greater efficiencies than priority schemes which eliminate individual demanders. Deleting 
entire demanders may cause large inefficiencies because demanders may not receive even their most 
highly valued units. Spulber also mentions that this rule is very simple and easy to implement; it is 
inexpensive to inform demanders of their allocation.1 One way to eliminate the inefficiency of delet-
ing entire demands is to transform the priority service contract to be defined on units and not on indi­
vidual demanders. Notice that this transfonnation also allows flexible planning by the demander, by 
breaking up his demands by reliability levels. 
One major question that arises in the allocation of priority contracts is how the market 
should be organized. Each of the aforementioned authors assumes common knowledge of the distri­
bution of supply fluctuation and individuals' valuations in their models. With this information, they 
can calculate the prices required to get individuals to "reveal" their type and obtain an efficient out­
come. However, when the information is not available, the rationing rules must be implemented 
within an institution. Each author is aware of this fact since each suggests possible market organiza­
tions which could assist in determining priority prices. Chao and Wilson suggest the use of priority 
points which demanders can purchase for "$1." Units are dispatched to demanders based on the 
number of priority points they assign to their demands. 2 Spulber suggests the trading of options 
where the supplier purchases options from demanders to repurchase supply during curtailment. By 
selling a certain number of options to the supplier, the demanders, in effect, choose a level of relia­
bility. Harris and Raviv develop a Modified Vickrey Auction as a mechanism to determine the 
1. This does not suggest that implementing priority service involves high-transaction costs. Our experience from the 
experiments we have conducted is that both rationing systems are easy to operate. 
2. It is easy to see that this mechanism is equivalent to a first-price sealed bid auction which is not efficient when demands 
are multiple-unit or bidders are not risk neutral. In addition, efficiency requires that demanders have rational expectations. 
That is, their priority-point selections must be based on correct estimates of the level of reliability they are purchasing--the 
map from points to rank order must be anticipated correctly. 
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priority prices.3 The difference between their scheme and Vickrey's is that a reservation sale price is 
set by the seller which may be greater than the highest-rejected bid; the reservation price is added to 
the standard mechanism to maximize the seller's revenue. 
In these models, market segmentation occcurs because the ex ante order in which units are 
dispensed have different values to each participant, i.e., demander k has value v j; for obtaining posi­
tion j for his ith unit. Thus, we have a "standard" assigmnent problem. One solution to assigmnent 
problems is the use of auctions (see Demange, et al. [1986]).4 The use of multi-item auctions can 
thus provide an institutional setting in which to study the price determination and allocation of prior­
ity contracts. For a summary of the theoretical literature on auctions, see McAfee and McMillan 
[1987] or Wilson [ 1990]. 
In this paper, we develop an experimental environment in which to test several combinations 
of multi-unit auctions and rationing rules. Specifically, we study an environment in which buyers 
have multiple-unit, continuous demands and in which supply is stochastic each period with a fixed 
distribution. Prices and allocations are determined using either an English or uniform price sealed 
bid auction. We selected the English auction because it is known to produce high efficiencies when 
buyers have single unit demands (see Cox et al. [1982] and McCabe et al. [1990]) and because it 
allows bidders continual feedback enabling them to update their beliefs (see Banks et al. [1989]). 
This updating feature may be of assistance to demanders especially in the absence of common infor­
mation. We will define common information as prior knowledge of the distributions of demands, 
supply, and supplier's cost. The uniform price auction we utilize is similar to the Modified Vickrey 
Auction in that it provides a baseline uniform price mechanism for each rationing scheme. Final! 
we test both auctions and rationing schemes, with and without common information. 5 
We have several issues to address here. What are the differences in the efficiencies and reve­
nues of the allocations under proportional rationing and priority service? How sensitive is each 
rationing rule and each auction to changes in the common knowledge structure ? Is one auction 
better able to obtain a more efficient allocation and generate more revenue than the other? Finally, 
can we find the "best" way, from the standpoint of efficiency, to organize the market in these 
environments? 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 details our experimental design, procedures, and 
auction institutions. The results of our experiments are listed and explained in section 3. Section 4 
lists our conclusions. 
IT. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
The experimental design/environment described below compares two information 
treatments (common information about the underlying distributions and no common information), 
3. The Vickrey [1961] auction is a sealed-bid auction in which the winner's price does not depend on his bid; but is instead 
the first rejected bid, and leads to a dominant strategy to reveal demand and/or supply. 
4. One major difference in the typical assignment literature and the environment we plan to discuss is that demanders can 
have multi-slot values and that the slots are single dimensional. Rassenti et al. [1986] and Banks et al. [1989] have addressed 
the multi-dimensional assignment problem in the context of a sealed-bid and progressive auction respectively. 
5. In all of our experimental conditions, demanders know their own type. 
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two pricing mechanisms (English and Uniform Price Sealed Bid auctions), and two rationing rules 
(Priority Service and Proportional Rationing)--see Table 1. To date very little research (both theory 
and experiments) has been conducted with one sided multi-unit auctions when demands are multi­
unit. In addition, the only direct experimental research with ex post rationing rules can be found in 
Banks et al [1989] and Elliot et al [1990]. The emphasis of these studies is different than ours. Banks 
et al focus their attention on a combinatorial fitting problem in addition to having a stochastic sup­
ply. Elliot et. al. investigate priority service and proportional rationing without an endogenous pric­
ing and allocation system. Furthermore, they use priority by individual as opposed to by unit. They 
found that priority service generated more efficient allocations than proportional rationing. Our 
design differs from theirs in the use of multi-unit auctions to determine prices and allocations and in 
prioritizing by unit. 
TABLE 1 EXPERIMENTAL CONDITIONS 
Auction Information Rationing Rules 
Priority Proportional 
Service Rationing 
English Common 
No Common 
Uniform Price Common 
No Common 
Our experimental environment, i.e., the supply and demand conditions, is induced using 
monetary incentives (those unfamiliar with experimental methods in economics should consult 
Smith [1982] or Plott [1989]). As we describe later, our environment allows for highly efficient out­
comes if individuals behave as price takers. 
A. THE ENVIRONMENT 
1. Demand Types 
There are many types of induced demand conditions under which to examine the mechan­
isms, informational environments and rationing rules defined above. For example, demands could 
have nonconvexities as would arise with minimum startup costs and indivisibilities. Such indivisibil­
ities may lead a proportional rationing scheme to large inefficiencies because when allocations are 
scaled back resources may go unused. In order to make the environment favorable to each rationing
system, in the sense of not trying deliberately to cause low efficiencies with either rationing rule, we 
chose the following conditions: 
(1)  Individual valuations are quadratic with three equally-likely demand types: 
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a 
- 0; q ; Prob [0; = 0] = 1h; i = 1, 2, 3.
(2) Demands were evaluated only at the discrete points corresponding to full units, but fractional
uuits were given utility based on the value associated with the next unit. Thus, although they were 
"kinked", demands were continuous. 
(3) At the beginning of every period each participant was assigned one of the three demand types 
from which to make his decision. 
(4) Only under the common-information treatment did each participant know the conditions in (1). 
The three demand types used in our experiments are listed in Table 2. 
TABLE 2 INDIVIDUAL DEMAND CURVES BY DEMAND TYPE (IN FRANCS)* 
Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 
Unit Marginal Value Marginal Value Marginal Value 
1 900 850 800 
--z; / uu :i:iu 400 
3 500 250 0 
4 300 0 0 
5 100 0 0 
6 0 0 0 
*Each Franc is worth .4 cents.
In each of our experiments six demanders competed for resources. Appendix A lists the
demand draws for 20 draws. The actual demand curve for the eighth draw of the experiment is pro­
vided in figure 1 : 
2. Supply Conditions
The capacity available to demanders each period was uncertain. In particular, the capacity
available to demanders took on one of three equally likely states--5 units, 10 units, or 15 units. 
Furthermore, there was a constant per unit cost (to the supplier) which served as a reservation price. 
The cost was drawn at the same time as the capacity. The cost could take on three possible states; 0, 
200, and 400 francs, each of which was equally likely. Thus, there were nine possible supply condi­
tions. In the common information treatment all subjects knew these conditions, but without common
information they were only given the ranges of output and cost--(0,15] and [0,400]. Table 3 lists the 
supply states and associated probabilities in our experiments with common information. 
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TABLE 3 SUPPLY STATES PROBABILITY MATRIX (UNDER COMMON INFORMATION)* 
Cost per Unit 
Capacity Units 0 200 400 
5 1/9 1/9 1/9 
10 1/9 1/9 1/9 
15 1/9 1/9 1/9 
*The expected value under these conditions is an output of I 0 units at a cost of 200.
The supply condition (quantity available and the cost draw) for each period can be found in 
appendix A. Figure 2 shows the actual supply state for period 8 of our experiment. In order to make 
it difficult for players to easily determine the underlying supply distribution with no common infor­
mation, we drew the actual supply from a nonuniform distibution. This distribution is illustrated in 
appendix A. 
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3.0ptimality and Competitive Equilibrium 
For each supply state we can calculate the difference between values drawn and cost. Denote 
* n * 
this ex-post surplus by II ' . Taking the expectation of these surpluses over each state, Lµ; II '
I 
,where p; is the probability of state i's occurance and there are n states, we can find the maximal ex 
ante surplus for the system. This measure indicates how well each pricing/rationing system performs 
relative to the competitive equilibrium for complete contingent claims markets. This will be our pri­
mary measure of the performance of the mechanisms. The competitive equilibrium prices for a com­
plete contingent contract in this environment can be easily calculated from the parameters (see 
appendix B). Figure 3 shows the competitive price for the three supply outcomes (5, 10 and 15 units) 
i.e. for priority one, two, and three respectively, with a zero cost draw. 
B. ALLOCATION MECHANISMS 
As was mentioned in the introduction, much of the theoretical work on priority pricing 
is devoid of a description of endogenous price determination. This study partially fills this gap by 
introducing specific auction processes that can assist in both allocating and pricing reliability. For 
this study we shall focus on two well-established auctions that produce efficient outcomes when 
demands are single units. The first auction we shall consider is the uniform price sealed bid auction 
in which the n+ 1 st bid determines the market price for the sale of n units. When individuals have 
multi-unit demands this auction may not produce efficient allocations since individuals have an 
incentive to underreveal their demand (it is, however, dominant to reveal on your highest valued 
unit). The second auction considered is the ascending bid English auction in which bids for indivi­
dual units are submitted and the process stops when no demander wishes to submit a new bid above 
the standing bids. When demands are single unit and when values are independent and private this 
auction is efficient and isomorphic to the uniform price auction. When demands are multi-unit this 
efficiency and isomorphism no longer holds. 
Wnile it is true that the mechanisms we have selected do not necessarily provide incentives to 
implement the efficient outcome, they do possess the following characteristics: 
i) The mechanisms are deficit-free (the budget is balanced and no transfers are necessary). 
ii) All demanders that are allocated units will (theoretically) pay the same price for the item (no
discrimination is necessary). 
iii) As the number of bidders increases the theoretical outcome converges to the competitive out-
come. 
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The experimental evidence to date on these auctions is quite diverse because of the many ways 
in which such auction markets can be organized. We can summarize this literature as follows: 
1) When demands have single values drawn independently from a fixed and common distribu-
tion, a single unit is to be auctioned and the the demanders know the distribution from which values 
are drawn both the English and Uniform price auction produce the competitive outcomes (see Cox et 
al [1982]). 
2) When demands have single values drawn independently from a fixed and common distribution 
and multiple units are to be auctioned, the English and Uniform price auction produce different out­
comes (see McCabe et al [1990]). The English auction is slightly more efficient and the prices it gen­
erates more stable. However, in order to make the English auction "work", a clock procedure had to 
be employed which proceeded as follows. Suppose n units were to be sold. The auctioneer started 
the price low and steadily increased it. At every price increment demanders indicated whether they 
were in or out of the bidding (once a demander drops out she could not re-enter). The price stopped 
rising when the market cleared, that is, when there were n demanders left "in" the auction. A method 
in which bids advanced from the floor (that had to be matched) did not fare as well. 
3) There has been very little work investigating enviromnents when demands are multiple unit 
and several units are to be auctioned. All previous studies consider only issues peripheral to the 
underlying institutions or do not directly compare second price sealed bid and English auctions. 
Bums [ 1985] considers sequential English auctions and found that they converge to the competitive 
equilibrium after a few periods. Miller and Plott [1985] investigate the uniform price sealed-bid auc­
tion. It converges to demand revealing behavior and is efficient. 6 Their study was designed to test 
the revenue generating properties of the uniform price auction against the discriminative auction. 
They placed several units at the margin while demands were for two units preventing demanders 
from underrevealing and thus got around the problem of strategic behavior on the part of demanders. 
The only other studies that use these institutions in more complicated enviromnents are Banks et al 
[1989] and Grether et al [1981]. Banks et al's results indicate that a uniform price sealed bid
mechanism does not seem to coordinate demands while an English auction is better. The sealed bid 
auction in Grether et. al. required the use of an after-market to achieve efficient allocations. 
Thus, the existing experimental evidence suggests that the English auction (if designed prop­
erly) is more robust than the uniform price auction. Here, we extend both of these auctions to allo­
cate priority. The next subsection describes in detail the mechanisms used in our experiment. 
1. English Auction with Priority Service
There were a maximum of 15 units available regardless of mechanism or rationing rule 
employed. In the English auction with priority service each of the fifteen units was assigned to a slot 
and each slot was bid on seperately. Each slot had an corresponding level of reliability or "priority 
6. In both of these studies there was no common information about demand types, but individuals' demands were fixed for 
several periods. 
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class". The fifteen slots were grouped into three priority classes with five units available in each
class. In addition. the auction for all units was simultaneous and not sequential so that subjects could 
see the price formation across the priority contracts. The rationing rule stipulated that class-one 
units would be supplied before class two units, and so forth. The auction closed randomly but within 
a pre-specified time interval. If no new bid was received on a unit in any class for 20 seconds the 
market closed even if the time interval had not yet elapsed.7 When there was no common informa­
tion, we added the condition that rationing within a priority class would be performed on the basis of 
the accepted bids, i.e., low bids were the first to be curtailed. Demanders paid the amount of their 
bid and only paid for units they received. 8 The Walrasian equilibrium for these contracts results in 
near 100% efficiency for our parameters (two periods are at 98% efficiency). Appendix B provides 
the method for calculating the Walrasian equilibrium prices and allocations for these contracts. 
2. English Auction with Proportional Rationing
In the English auction with proportional rationing a uniform price English "clock" deter­
mined price and allocations. The auction opened with a low-posted price at which buyers submitted 
the amount they demanded. If demand was greater than the maximal capacity of 15 units at that 
price, the price was increased. To "guarantee" covergence, demanders could only stand pat or reduce 
their demand at each new price. If there was no "clearing" price, units were dispensed at the highest 
price at which demand did not exceed the maximal capacity (15 units). Units were then curtailed 
proportionally.9 That is, rationing was based on the number of units (out of the 15 unit capacity) sub­
scribed for at the market-clearing price. Demanders paid only for units and fractions of units they 
received. 
We utilized the English clock because all 15 units are treated as identical and thus only one 
price is needed. There is no need to rank units by bids or class since rationing is based on subscrip­
tion. As we did for the other contracts, we calculate the prices and tbe allocations under the Walra­
sian equilibrium. This institution is not ex-ante fully efficient because demanders cannot choose an 
optimal quantity for each realization of supply. However, for our parameters, efficiency under tbe 
Walrasian equilibrium is above 97% every period. 
3. Uniform Price Sealed Bid with Priority Service
The sealed-bid mechanism used in the experiments was a second price auction in which the 
price per unit was determined by the first-rejected bid. Subjects could submit up to ten bids in a 
period of the form < P ,Q >, where P was a per-unit bid and Q was the number of units, in tenths, 
requested at that price. All of the submitted bids were arrayed from highest to lowest. When the 
supply draw was made the quantity supplied was the quantity at which the bid array "crossed" the 
supply array with price being the higher of the first-rejected bid or the cost draw. All of the bids
7. Only two periods met the 20 second closing criteria so most auctions were closed under the fixed time rule. The fixed 
stopping time was only approximate, subjects knew that the actual stopping time was random. Operationally we "soft 
closed" the market around the approximate closing time selected. In addition, the random closing time was decreased as the 
periods increased. Subjects were informed of this fact. 
8. If a demander's bid did not cover the reservation price he/she was not awarded any units. 
9. Final allocations were determined by multiplying the ex-ante allocations by [actual capacity/15]. 
1 1  
greater than the price were accepted. Dem anders received an amount of units equal to the sum of the 
quantities specified in their accepted bids. With our parameters, the highest five bids were always 
accepted, the next five highest are accepted two-thirds of the time, etc, ... Therefore, the top five bids 
had highest priority. An example is provided in Figure 4.
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Notice that, if demanders behave like price-takers, that a fully efficient allocation is achieved 
because the price is conditional on the realization of supply. That is, it is equilvalent to a full menu 
of contingent claims contracts. Thus we avoid the problem, which occurs with proportional ration­
ing, of the demanders being able to choose only one quantity to maximize profits across realizations 
of supply. 
4. Uniform Price Sealed Bid with Proportional Rationing
The proportional rationing fonnulation of the sealed bid mechanism allowed demanders to 
submit up to 10 bids of the fonn <P,Q>. The bids were arrayed as in the priority service fonnulation 
and the price and allocation were detennined as follows. The fifteen units were initially allocated to 
the demanders who submitted the highest bids. They paid a per unit price equal to the higher of the 
highest rejected bid and the cost draw. When the actual supply is less than than 15  units, the alloca­
tions were scaled back by the fraction of the maximal capacity that was supplied. Demanders only 
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paid fo r  units which they actually received. 
All of the auctions described above were conducted with and without common information
of the underlying distributions. The instructions used for these experiments can be found in appendix 
D. 
C. PROCEDURES 
There were six subjects in each experiment. An experiment consisted of at least seven 
periods in one of four mechanism/rationing-rule conditions. Subjects read a set of computerized 
instructions and then participated in a practice round of bidding to familiarize themselves with the 
institution and accounting procedures. Table 4 lists the experiments we conducted. 
TABLE 4 SUMMARY OF EXPERIMENTS CONDUCTED 
Experiment# M echanismJ Rule/ Periods Subject Pool 
Experiment Average 
Information Duration* Profits 
1 EIPS/CO 8 Caltech 1 15 15.00 
2 SIPS/CO IO Caltech 90 13.50 
3 EIPS/NOCO 8 Occidental 1 10 14.25 
4 SIPS/NOCO IO Caltech 95 14.00 
5 SIPR/CO IO Caltech 83 15.50 
6 EIPR/CO IO Caltech 95 14.50 
EfPSfCO 10 eatte<:h t2 
8 EIPS/NOCO IO  Caltech I05 15.00 
9 EIPS/CO 7 PCC 1 10 12.00 
1 0  EIPR/CO 8 PCC I05 13.00 
1 1  EIPR/NOCO IO Caltech 90 14.50 
12  EIPR/NOCO IO Caltech IOO 15.00 
13  SIPS/CO IO PCC 95 15.50 
14 SIPS/NO CO IO PCC 90 15.00 
15 SIPS/CO IO Caltech 85 15.75 
16 SIPR/CO IO PCC 100 15.00 
17 SIPR/NOCO 10 PCC 95 15.25 
18 SIPR/NOCO IO PCC 95 15.00 
E = English, SB = Sealed Bid, PS = Priority Service, PR = Proportional Rationing, CO = Common 
Information 
*In minutes 
ill. RESULTS 
The section presents the resuits of the experiments listed in table 4. We first investigate the 
overall performance of each institution in terms of efficiency and contract prices and then investigate 
the individual behavior of participants in each market. 
A. OVERALL PERFORMANCE 
1. Efficiency
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Table 5 below provides the mean efficiency achieved a s  a percent o f  the optimum ( competi­
tive equilibrium) for each institution. 10 Within each cell are the efficiency for all periods (left two 
numbers in the cell) and the efficiency for periods 5 and above (right two numbers in the cell). 
TABLE 5 EFFICIENCY (PERCENT AGE OF OPTIMUM) OF EACH INSTITUTION 
Priority Service Proportional Rationing 
mean range mean range mean range mean range 
E/Co 90 (70,99) 92 (81,99) 86 (71 ,99) 84 (70,99) 
E/NoCo 92 (84,99) 93 (86,99) 9 1  (74,99) 91 (74,99) 
SB/Co 92 (79,98) 96 (93,98) 87 (74,99) 89 (74,97) 
SB/NoCo 96 (90,100) 98 (94, 100) 90 (80,97) 90 (80,97) 
We can state the following results: 
Result 1: Priority service generates higher efficiencies than proportional rationing within both
mechanisms but is significant only within the Uniform price sealed bid mechanism. 
Support: A rank sum test of the efficiencies yields a z-score of 1.79 and 3.77 for the common and 
no common information cases respecl!vely m the sealed-bid mechanism. The z-scores for the 
English auction are .84 and .23. 
Result 2: The uniform price sealed bid auction (with priority service) outperforms the English
auction. 
Support: The rank sum test of efficiencies yields z-scores of 1.23 and 2.70 for the common and no 
common information cases respectively. 
Result 1 suggests that unless one has some specific information about the underlying supply 
and demand conditions one should use priority service over proportional rationing. For example, if 
demand curves are continuous and individual's quantities demanded at the optimum are proportional 
across supply states, then proportional rationing, as well as priority service, is likely to lead to high 
efficiencies.11 Result 2 suggests that the uniform price sealed bid auction seems to work well. The
next three results compare the no common information with the common information condition: 
10. The theoretical expected efficiencies resulting from posting the Priority Prices calculated by the method found in Wilson 
(1989) and the Proportional Rationing prices calculated by the method found in Spulber (1989) for our parameters average 
92.0 % and 94.8 % respectively. 
11. For example, suppose there are two supply states. In states one n units are supplied, while in state two 2n lLTJ.its are 
supplied. For each buyer, quantity demanded at the optimum is q in state one and 2q in state two. 
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Result 3: Each mechanism performs better when there is no common information providing a 
basis for common priors. The gains are most significant in Sealed Bid/ PS. 
Support: The rank sum tests yields z-scores of 1 . 12 (Sealed Bid /PR), 1 . 16  (English Auction/ PS), 
1.33 (English/ PR), and 3.19 (Sealed Bid/ PS). 
In the case of multi-unit demands, the English auction (with priority service) did not perform
as well as expected given the results of past studies. It did prove slightly better for the case of pro­
portional rationing. These results suggest that either: 
a) The way in which the auction was implemented could be improved upon, or 
b) The fact that there were several supply states may have a detrimental effect on the performance
of the English Auction. 
We will discuss a) later and will now concentrate on b) by considering the ability of each 
mechanism to allocate each contingent claim. In general, each mechanism performs worst when the 
reservation price is 400 and 10 or 15 units are available. Thus, the cost covering uncertainty condi­
tion is not handled well by any of the mechanisms. If we focus only on the 0 reservation price states 
we find some of the sources of inefficiency in the mechanisms (see figures 5 and 6). Proportional 
rationing works best when units must be rationed while priority service works best when the system 
is in its worst and best states. The major source of inefficiency in the English auction with priority 
service comes in the intermediate supply condition. As we shall see in the next subsection this result 
is caused by "strategic" behavior of the participants. 
2. Revenue and Prices
Recall, that we can determine the Walrasian equilibrium prices for each contract implicit in 
each mechanism. That is, given that either priority service or proportional rationing contracts are to 
be allocated, we can determine the competitve equilibria for these contacts. Each of the above 
mechanisms yield at their market clearing prices different revenue. In table 6, we show the predicted 
mean revenue for each institution at their market- clearing prices (the calculations for each institu­
tion are supplied in appendix B). The revenue levels achieved as a percent of the competitive equili­
brium for complete contingent contracts (CECCC) are given in table 7 .12 
12. The mean revenue generated with our parameters by posting the Priority Service and Proportional Rationing nrices are 
4350 and 4480 respectively. 
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TABLE 6 COMPETITIVE MEAN REVENUE BY MECHANISM 
Uniform Price Auction English Auction 
Priority Proportional Priority Proportional 
Service Rationing Service Rationing 
6183* 4441 3813 4441 
* This is also the CECCC predicted mean revenue 
TABLE 7 ACTUAL REVENUE AS A% of CECCC (MEANS AND RANGES) 
Priority Service Proportional Rationing 
Uniform Common 71 70 75 77 
(52,82) (58,82) (47,98) (48,93) 
Uniform No Common 68 67 56 58 
(46,85) (46,83) (28,79) (34,79) 
English Common 68 71 70 69 
(45,89) (48,89) (31,120) (31,102) 
English No Common 66 65 74 71 
(34,98) (34,94) (27,113) (27,99) 
We now state the following results: 
Result 4: Each institution yields revenues significantly below the CECCC revenue levels. 
Support: Tue t-statistics of deviations from the CECCC ranged from -4.99 to -20.34. 
For each mechanism we can calculate the competetive prices for the contracts being sold. Fig­
ures 7 through 9 are the boxplots of the actual prices in the market as a percentage of the Walrasian 
equilibrium prices. The time series for each experiment are given in appendix C. The results are as 
follows: 
Result 5: Priority 1 prices are significantly below the market clearing price in the Uniform Price
Auction. We cannot reject the hypothesis that priority 2 and 3 are equal to the market clearing 
prices. The variance of the prices relative to the market clearing case, however, is high. 
Support: The mean and standard deviation for the differences of the contract prices and the Walra­
sian equilibrium are given below. 
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TABLE 8 SEALED BID AUCTION WITH PRIORITY SERVICE 
Priority 1 Priority 2 Priority 3 
mean stdev mean stdev mean stdev 
Common -117 44 13 64 31.6 141 
No Common -95 69 -19 68 -9 143 
Result6: In the English auction with priority service we find that priority 1 prices are above
and priority 3 prices are below the market clearing price. Therefore, a premium is being paid for 
high priority and a discount for low priority. 13 
Support: See the following table which gives the differences between the prices observed in the 
experiment and the Walrasian equilibrium prices: 
TABLE 9 ENGLISH AUCTION WITH PRIORITY SERVICE 
Priority 1 Priority 2 Priority 3 
mean stdev mean stdev mean stdev 
Common 57 93 -14 121 -64 174 
No Common 14 101 29 99 -45 112 
Result 7: The proportional rationing Walrasian prices seem to be good predictors of the 
observed prices. There is, however, substantial variance in the prices. 
Support: The next table shows the differences between the observed prices and the prices that 
would result if all demanders were price takers. The differences are computed for both the English 
and the Uniform Price Auctions under proportional rationing. 
13. We fail to reject the hypothesis that prices for all slots within each class are the same. For every experiment the mean 
difference between the price in slot 2 and slot 1 was less than 1.5 standard deviations. The same was true for the differences 
between slots 3-5 and slot 1. In priority class two we compared the differences between the prices for slots 7-10 and slot 6, 
and in class three the differences between slots 12-15 and slot 11. In all cases we had the same result as in class 1. 
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TABLE 10 PROPORTIONAL RATIONING PRICES 
Uniform Price English 
mean stdev mean stdev 
Common 19.8 52 16.7 101 
No Common -99.3 100 39.5 91 
In general, we have found that market clearing prices based on price taking 
behavior are not good predictors of prices generated by the mechanisms.14 It seems likely that, either 
risk aversion and/or strategic behavior are causing the deviation in these prices from the competitive 
equilibrium. We discuss the behavior of individual bidders next. 
B. INDIVIDUAL BEHAVIOR 
1. Priority Service
a. Uniform Price Auction
In figure 10 we show the error bars of bids for each value of the three demand types (under
common information) for periods 5 to 10. This figure makes clear that there is underrevelation of 
demand occurring in this mechanism. There is a large interval for the high type demanders on their 
bids for units below their highest value. The low demand types have a large interval for bids on their 
high value and a very small interval for bids on their low valued unit. For all types of demanders, the 
intervals are smaller when there is no common information. 
In searching through the data, we have identified four mutually exclusive and exhaustive
bidding strategies used by subjects. These bidding strategies are defined as follows: 
l)Reveal:These are bids that exactly match values
2)Underreveal:These are bids that are less than or equal to each value and strictly less for at 
least one of the bids submitted 
3)Area:Bids such that any ordered subsets of bids that are accepted will not result in a loss.
However, there is overrevalation on at least one unit. 
4)DORQ:(Dominated Overrevalation of Quantity) There is an overrevalation which may 
cause the demander to lose money. 
14. The Wilson posted prices are not good predictors of the observed priority prices. The mean differences in the English 
Auction are 92 francs for priority one, 143 for priority two, and 161 for priority three with the observed prices always less 
than the posted. The means of the quantity (observed prices -posted prices) for the sealed bid are 31, 20 and-61 francs for 
priority classes one, two and three respectively. The Spulber posted prices are also poor predictors of the observed 
proportional rationing prices. In the English Auction, the observed prices exceed the posted by an average of 36 francs and 
the variance is very high. In the sealed bid auction the posted prices exceed the observed by an average of 89 francs and the 
variance is, again, very high. 
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Notice that Area and DORQ bidding are dominated strategies. Area and DORQ bidders are 
trying to aggregate parts of their demands (flattening their demands) in an attempt to get units into a 
higher priority class than they would if they bid their valuations. Figures 1 1  through 14 illustrate the 
frequency of these strategies by period. The results are straightforward. 
Result 8: Demand underrevelation makes up the largest category of bidders and grows over time.
The demand revelation category is small with slight growth over time. DORQ all but vanishes while 
Area bidding falls slightly over time. 
In general, given the high efficiency of this mechanism, the potentially damaging strategies 
types (underreveal, area and DORQ) do not substantially affect the ranking of values. 
b. English Auction
In order to uncover the strategic behavior of participants in the English Auction with priority 
service, we will consider individual quantity deviations from the Walrasian equilibrium. Figure 15 
shows the difference between the allocations demanders of each of the three types received in each 
class and what they would have received at the Walrasian equilibrium. 
Result 9: We see a tendency for demanders of type one to receive less units in classes 2 and 3 than 
under the Walrasian equilibrium. In class one we find this difference to be zero in most cases. In 
class 2, we see a tendency for type one demanders to "drop" units. We define dropping a unit as not 
continuing to bid on it at a lower price than would occur in a Walrasisn equilibrium. Types 2 and 3 
receive essentially the allocations that they would under the Walrasian equilibrium. In class 3, type 1
demanders receive more and type 3 less than under price taking. 
One might attempt to modify the English Auction so that it would perfonn better. The poor 
perfonnance of the English auction under priority service may be corrigeable with the following 
modification: change the mechanism to an english clock where all demanders know how many units 
are asked for by buyers as the price increases. The clock stops when a total of one unit is demanded. 
Priority is then given in descending order of the drop-out points. This mechanism incorporates the 
feature of a unifonn price while eliciting the entire order of demand. 
2. Proportional Rationing
a. Uniform Price Auction
We can compare the observed allocations with the allocations which would occur in a Wal­
rasian Equilibrium. That is, we look at the difference in the number of units allocated ex-ante to each 
demander. We note the following: 
Result JO: The Walrasian model is not a good predictor of the final allocations of this mechanism.
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Support: The differences between the Walrasian model and the observed allocations are often large 
and do not seem to form any systematic pattern. This result, coupled with the result that this was the 
least efficient of the four conditions, leads us to believe that this mechanism interferes with the for­
mation of consistent strategies. 
b. English Auction
It appears that type one demanders "dropped" units, that is decreased their demands at lower 
prices than they would in a Walrasian equilibrium, causing other demanders, especially type three 
demanders, to be allocated extra units. Thus, there seems to be some tendency toward underrevata­
tion. Let us distinguish between three mutually exclusive and exhaustive bidding strategies pursued 
by demanders: 
1) Overbidders: those who drop units at prices higher than they would in a Walrasian equili-
brium. 
2) U nderbidders: those who drop units at prices lower than they would in a Walrasian equili-
brium. 
3) Mtxed: those wbo do both. 
Figure 16 gives the percentage of the time that each strategy was pursued by each demander 
type overall as well as in the last four periods. It appears that demander behavior does not change 
over time. No "learning" is taking place. 
--------
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IV. CONCLUSIONS
This study considered two alternative institutions which have desirable properties when 
demands are for single units, the English and the Sealed Bid Uniform Price Auction, with which to 
implement priority service and proportional rationing. We recognize that these experiments are 
exploratory, especially in light of the paucity of previous literature on the topic of auctions when
demands are multi-unit. 
Our results suggest that although proportional rationing does seem to do well when large 
curtailments arise, that priority service generates more efficient allocations than proportional ration­
ing in our environment. Here we are in agreement with the results of Elliot et. al. even though their 
"pricing mechanism" is vastly different. It is an open question, however, whether there exists a better 
implementation of proportional rationing than those we chose. 
Contrary to previous results, the Sealed Bid implementation of priority service performed 
better than the English. The two mechanisms are no longer strategically equivalent in the multi-unit 
demand environment and their relative efficiencies are parameter dependent. 
The level of efficiency was higher in the absence of common information. Without the com­
mon information on which to condition their demands it may have been more difficult to behave 
strategically. Strategic behavior is evident in the large deviations of observed prices to those that 
would have prevailed had all demanders been price takers when there was common information. For 
the environment and auctions used in our study, the competitive model is not a good predictor. 
Appendices 
Appendix A lists the demand draws for the first twenty periods . It also gives 
the distribution from which supply is drawn in the experiments in which 
demander s  had no common information . 
Appendix B explains the cal culation of efficiencies and revenues used in the 
paper . It also explains the calculation of the prices and allocations under 
the Walrasian equilibria . 
Appendix C illustrates the time series of the deviations of the observed 
prices from the competitive (Walrasian) pri ces in the various experimental 
conditions . 
Appendix D contains truncated versions of the instructions which sub j ects 
read before the experiment s .  
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Demand and Cost Draws 
Subj ect 
1 2 3 
Period 
4 5 6 
1 L H H L M H 
2 L L M L L M 
3 M L M M M H 
4 M M H H M L 
5 H M H M H H 
6 L L M H L L 
7 H M L M L H 
8 L L H H H L 
9 L H M M L H 
10 L M M H L L 
H=Type 1 demand M=Type 2 demand L=Type 3 demand 
Supply Draws 
Period Quantity Cost 
1 5 0 
2 5 0 
3 1 0  4 0 0  
4 1 0  0 
5 1 0  2 0 0  
6 5 2 0 0  
7 1 5  0 
8 1 0  2 0 0  
9 1 0  2 0 0  
1 0  1 0  0 
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APPENDIX B 
EFFICIENCY AND REVENUE CALCULATIONS 
1 .  Uniform Price with Priority Service 
The calculation of efficiency proceeds as follows. First, we form the entire array of bids in a 
similar fashion as the array of valuations in figure 1 .  These are the bids on every unit ranked from 
highest to lowest. 
Here we define bidding competitively as bidding without attempting to affect the price. 
Notice that this is the same as truthful revelation of demand. Therefore, if demanders are behaving 
like price-takers , the bid array equals the actual array of valuations. 
There is a maximum amount of surplus realizable in each of the nine states. Notice that this 
area is bounded by the demand array, the supply, and the cost curve as in the figure 26. The 
efficiency of the mechanism in a state is the fraction of this maximum surplus which is actually real­
ized. Notice that if all bidders are behaving competitively in the uniform price auction the efficiency 
is 100%. When all bidders are behaving competitvely, we term the resulting equilibrium the Walra­
sian. 
Suppose we define the maximum realizable surplus when the supply capacity is 5 and the 
cost is 0 as v? (when the supply is 10 and the cost is 400 the surplus is v fr,00 , etc ... ). Let us define the 
actual surplus which would result from the bids made if the supply were 5 and the cost 0 as vbid? .  
Then the formula for the ex-ante efficiency of the allocation is given by: 
( b •d O  b "d 200 b "d 400)/( 0 200 400)v l 5 +v l 5 + ... +v l 15 V 5 +V5 + . . .  +V 15 
The ex-ante revenue is calculated in the following manner. Consider the prices and quantity 
sold in each supply state given the array of bids. Recall that the price in this mechanism is deter­
mined by the higher of the highest rejected bid and the cost draw. Define the prices for each supply 
state asp �,. .. ,p� as we did with efficiencies. Then the ex-ante revenue can be calculated as follows: 
(5*p ?  + . . . +15*p t?D )/9
2. English Priority Service
The efficiencies, prices, and revenues are calculated as follows. Array the bids as in section 1 and 
determine the area of surplus. The efficiency is then calculated as in the uniform price auction. It will 
tum out that under price-taking the efficiency will not always be 100%. The prices of the competitve 
equilibrium are calculated by finding a set of prices which cause the demanders with the five highest 
values to not want to change their bids if they are in priority class one. The same must apply to the 
sixth through tenth highest bidders in priority class two and the 1 1th through 15th highest in class 
three. The price in class ihree must be high enough so that the 16th highest bidder would not attempt 
to enter class three. We choose the lowest set of prices for which these conditions are met. Notice 
that the price in classes two and three are sometimes below the cost draw of 400. If this is the case 
and costs are actually 400 in the realizable supply state then there may be units whose valuations are 
greater than 400 are not allocated. We therefore make the following correction. For every price less 
than 400, we ask if the demander would be better off, ex-ante, if he were to bid 400. If he is better 
off, we then raise his bid from the "Walrasian" to 400. It is not always the case, however, that the 
demander is better off, and this accounts for the inefficiency of this auction. Revenue is calclated by 
the same fonnula as in the unifonn price auction. The obvious differences are in the way the prices 
are set (they are equal to the actual amount bid) and the correction discussed above. 
3. English and Unifonn Price Auctions with Proportional Rationing 
Ex-ante efficiency is detennined as before, as the weighted fraction of maximum possible 
surplus allocated ex ante with the bids made. The efficiency calculation for price-taking demanders 
makes use of the competitive proportional rationing bidding function which is defined as a mapping 
from price to the set of positive integers which indicates the number of slots a demander wants to 
win at that price. The following table lists at which prices a demander of each type would lower her 
demand from the number of units specified in the column labeled unit to one unit less if she were 
behaving competitively. 
Recall that behaving competitively means bidding as if one could not affect the price (no strategic 
underbidding). 
Unit Price 
Demander Type 
Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 
1 900 850 800 
2 767 750 533 
3 567 350 267 
4 483 275 0 
5 350 150 0 
Notice that efficiency here will not be 1 00% for our parameters because the allocation is can not be 
efficient for supplies of 5,10, and 15 units simultaneously. This bidding function is the same for both 
the English and the Unifonn Price Auctions with proportional rationing. Since the price is unifonn 
and the same no matter what the supply state, the price and revenue calculations are very simple. The 
price is that price which clears the market if all demanders are behaving as price takers. The revenue 
is this price multiplied by the quantity supplied in each state weighted by the probability of the state. 
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I INSTRUCTIONS I
You are about to participate in an experiment in which you will make decisions 
in a market . The profits you make in this experiment will be converted into 
U . S .  dollars and will be yours to keep . Follow the instructions carefully. 
You will be paid in cash at the end of the experiment . 
The experiment will broken up into a series of "periods" in which you will 
make decisions . At the beginning of each period you will be given a Redemption 
Value Sheet . The Redemption Value Sheets describe the value to you of a 
fictitious commodity you can purchase in the market. Your Redemption Value 
Sheet is your own private information. You should not reveal its contents . 
Each participant in the experiment will be given one of three possible 
Redemption Value Sheet s .  Each participant has an equal chance of being assigned 
any one of the Redemption Value Sheets at the beginning of a period. 
Press Enter To Continue 
You will find below the three possible Redemption Value Sheets that 
can be assigned to you. The sheets l ist the units, the incremental value of each 
unit, and the total value of obtaining the listed number of units . All values 
are stated in francs and each franc is worth . 004 dollars to you . Your franc 
earnings will be converted at this rate at the end of the experiment . 
Redemption Value Sheet # 1  Redemption Value Sheet # 2  Redemption Value Sheet #3 
Unit Additional Total Unit Additional Total Unit Additional Total 
Value Value Value Value Value Value 
1 9 0 0  9 0 0  1 850 8 5 0  1 8 0 0  8 0 0  
2 7 0 0  1600 2 550 1 4 0 0  2 4 0 0  1 2 0 0  
3 500 2 100 3 2 5 0  1 6 5 0  3 0 1200 
4 3 0 0  2 4 0 0  4 0 1650 4 0 1200 
5 1 0 0  2 5 0 0  5 0 1650 5 0 1200 
6 0 2 5 0 0  6 0 1650 6 0 1200 
Press Enter to Continue 
In addition, fractional values will also be of value to you. Fractional 
units are given the value of the portion of the unit it obtains . For example, 
on redemption sheet # 1  if you obtained 1 . 5  units you would get a redemption 
value of 9 0 0  + 7 0 0* . 5 = 1 2 5 0  francs . Thus you take the fraction of the unit you 
obtain times its additional value and add that to the total of the previous 
units. 
Redemption Value Sheet # 1  Redemption Value Sheet # 2  Redemption Value Sheet #3  
Unit 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
Additional 
Value 
9 0 0  
7 0 0  
5 0 0  
3 0 0  
100 
0 
Total 
Value 
9 0 0  
1 6 0 0  
2 10 0  
2 4 0 0  
2 5 0 0  
2 5 0 0  
Unit 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
Additional 
Value 
850 
550 
2 5 0  
0 
0 
0 
Total 
Value 
8 5 0  
1400 
1650 
1650 
1650 
1 6 5 0  
Press Enter to Continue 
Unit 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
Additional 
Value 
8 0 0  
4 0 0  
0 
0 
0 
0 
Total 
Value 
8 0 0  
1 2 0 0  
1 2 0 0  
1 2 0 0  
1 2 0 0  
1 2 0 0  
------�F�o�r Sheet # 1 we see that the total value of obtaining ? nni t- i:: i i:: l h ll ll 
franc s ,  so that the addition to your total value of securing another unit if you 
had 1 unit is 7 0 0  francs . To make sure you understand these values please answer 
the following questions (type in the number and press return : 
- On sheet 2 what is the value of obtaining 3 units? 1650 
- on sheet 1 what is the additional value of obtaining a third unit? 2 3 0 0  
Redemption Value Sheet # 1  
Unit 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
Additional 
Value 
9 00 
7 0 0  
5 0 0  
3 0 0  
1 0 0  
0 
Total 
Value 
9 0 0  
1 6 0 0  
2 100 
2 4 0 0  
2 5 0 0  
2 5 0 0  
Redemption Value Sheet # 2  Redemption Value Sheet # 3  
Unit 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
Additional 
Value 
850 
550 
250 
0 
0 
0 
Total 
Value 
8 5 0  
1 4 0 0  
1 6 5 0  
1650 
1650 
1650 
Unit 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
Additional 
Value 
8 0 0  
4 0 0  
0 
0 
0 
0 
Total 
Value 
8 0 0  
1 2 0 0  
1 2 0 0  
1 2 0 0  
1 2 0 0  
1 2 0 0  
Press Enter t o  Continue 
You can obtain units of the commodity by participating in the market processes 
we will describe below . The number of units available to participants is not 
known with certainty prior to the market process . The total number 
of units to be supplied is listed in the table below along with thei r  chance of 
occurrence : 
Units 
5
1 0
15
Units Available to Participants 
Chance of the units being available 
� 3
� 3
� 3
Thus there is an equal ( 1/ 3 )  chance. that there will be 5 ,  1 0 ,  or 15 units
available to be distributed to participants . The amount of units available will 
be announced after the market process has ended for the period . How the units 
will be rationed among the participants will be discussed next . 
Press Enter to Continue 
t OPEN AUCTION WITH I
t PRIORITY CLASSES I
There will be three priority classes of the commodity available for 
participants . The table below l ists the capacity available for each priority 
class . The allocation rule ( after supply is revealed) is that class 1 capacity
will be served before class 2 capacity , which will be served before class 3
capacity. There are 5 total units available in each priority class to be
allocated to participants . Given the chances of total system capacity 
discussed previously , we find that priority #1 units will always be 
suppl ied while priority #2 units will be supplied with 2/3 chance and priority
#3 with a 1/ 3 chance.
Priority Class # 1 Priority Class # 2 Priority Class #3
Capacity = 5 Capacity = 5 Capacity = 5 
Always available 2/3 chance of delivery 1/ 3 chance of del ivery
Press Enter to Continue 
You can obtain units in these priority classes by bidding for units in 
each class . Bids can be submitted for each priority class for units of the 
commodity through your computer keyboard . When the period opens find the 
priority class you would l ike and submit a bid in francs .  Below you will find 
the screen for class # 1  units . There are five slots for bids for the five 
available units in class # 1 .  The box on the right is called the order box in
which you can submit a bid for any of the five units in class # 1 .  The order
box can be moved to any of the five slots for a bid submittal . Use the arrow 
keys to move the order box. Do this now . 
I D  BID UNIT A X
!Class # 1  t t t t t t 1 t
I Class # 1  t t t t Ay 
!Class # 1  t t t t 
!Class #1 t t t t 
tclass # 1  t t t t 
I
Press Enter to Continue 
You can obtain units in these priority classes by bidding for units in 
each class . Bids can be submitted for each priority class for units of the 
commodity through your computer keyboard . When the period opens find the 
priority class you would l ike and submit a bid in francs .  Below you will find 
the screen for class # 1  unit s .  There are five slots for bids for the five 
available units in class # 1 .  The box on the right is called the order box in
which you can submit a bid for any of the five units in class # 1 .  The order
box can be moved to any of the five slots for a bid submittal . Use the arrow 
keys to move the order box . Do this now . 
I D  BID UNIT 
IClass # 1  t t I t Ax 
I Class # 1  I t t t I t 1 t
!class # 1  t t I t A y 
!Class #1 t t t t 
!Class # 1  I t I t 
I 
Press Enter to continue 
You can go to the other priority classes by pressing page down and page up 
keys . Do this now to view these markets . Notice that they have the same 
structure as the previous screens . 
ID BID UNIT 'X 
!Class #2  t t t t t t 1 t 
I Class #2  t t t t 'Y 
!Class # 2  t t t t 
!Class #2  t t t t 
I Class #2  t t t t 
t 
Press Enter to continue 
suppose a period has started and the bids in class # 1  are as below. 
Notice that bidder 1 has two bids in class # 1 .  I f  you would l ike to make a bid 
for a unit in class # 1  j ust move the order box to any of the slots and 
submit a bid in francs (whole numbers only) . In the example below notice that 
bidder 3 has the lowest current bid in class # 1  at 150 . To bump that bid j ust 
move your order box to the third slot and submit a bid for 170 . Do this now . 
ID BID UNIT 
I Class # 1  t l t 2 0 0  t 1 t 'X 
!Class # 1  t 2 t 2 3 0  t 1 t t t 1 t 
I Class #1 t 3 t 150 t 1 t 'Y 
I Class # 1  t 1 t 2 0 0  t 1 t 
I Class # 1  t 5 t 2 0 0  t 1 t 
t 
Press Enter to Continue 
Suppose a period has started and the bids in class # 1  are as below. 
Notice that bidder 1 has two bids in class # 1 .  I f  you would l ike to make a bid 
for a unit in class # 1  j ust move the order box to any of the slots and 
submit a bid in francs (whole numbers only) . In the example below notice that 
bidder 3 has the lowest current bid in class # 1  at 150 . To bump that bid j ust 
move your order box to the third slot and submit a bid for 170 .  
Now type in the 170 bid (use backspace to erase) and press Fl to submit 
your bid . Do this now . 
ID BID UNIT 
I Class #1 I 1 '.t 2 0 0  't 1 I 
I Class # 1  t 2 t 2 3 0  't 1 t ' X  
I Class # 1  I 3 t 150 't 1 I I 170I 1 I 
I Class #1 I 1 t 2 0 0  't 1 I A Y 
I Class # 1  I 5 t 2 0 0  't 1 t 
t 
Press Enter to Continue 
Your bid is now in the market ( in this example you are bidder 6 ) . You 
can enter as many bids as you l ike for any of the classes you would l ike . 
The market closing rules and payments will know . be discussed in detail . 
I D  BID UNIT 
I Class # 1  t 1 t 2 0 0  t 1 t
I Class # 1  I 2 t 2 3 0  t 1 I Ax 
I Class # 1  t 6 t 1 7 0  t 1 t t I 1 I 
!Class # 1  I 1 t 2 0 0  t 1 t A y  
I Class # 1  t 5 t 2 0 0  t 1 t 
I 
Press Enter to Continue 
The auction will close for the period if no new bids are submitted within 
20 seconds of the previous bid. When the market closes the available supply 
will be posted ( 5 ,  1 0 ,  or 15 units) . In addition , a production cost per unit 
of capacity will be announced ( 0 ,  2 0 0 ,  or 4 0 0  francs which are equally l ikely to 
be announced) .  Units will dispersed in the following manner: 
Condition 
Units Production Costs 
5 4 0 0  francs 
5 2 00 francs 
5 O francs
10 4 0 0  francs 
10 2 0 0  francs 
10 0 francs 
15 4 0 0  francs 
15 2 0 0  francs 
15 0 francs 
Rule 
Allocation of units 
Class #1 bidders with bids at least 4 0 0  
Class #1 bidders with bids a t  least 2 0 0  
Class # 1  bidders with bids a t  least o
Class #1&2 bidders with bids at least 4 0 0  
Class #1&2 bidders with bids a t  least 200 
Class #1&2 bidders with bids at least O
Class # 1 , 2 & 3  bidders with bids at least 400 
Class # 1 , 2 & 3  bidders with bids at least 200 
Class # 1 , 2 & 3  bidders with bids at least O
Press Enter to Continue 
For example, suppose the final bids in each of the classes were as below 
and 10 units at a unit production cost of 2 0 0  francs was drawn . Then all the 
bids in class 1 & 2 would be accepted and each of those bidders would be 
allocated units and pay their bids for the units . In particular, bidder 4 would 
be given 2 units and pay a total of 990 francs ( 1  at 500 francs and 1 at 4 9 0 )  . 
Bidder 4 earnings would be equal to his total redemption value for 2 units minus 
990 franc s .  Bidders only pay for their bids on units they receive . 
Please answer the following question : 
If there are 15 units available at a production cost of 2 0 0  francs and 
bidder l has redemption value sheet 1 his earnings would be 2 
ID BID UNIT ID BID UNIT ID BID UNIT 
I Class #1 t 1 t 5 0 0  t 1 I IClass #2 t 3 t 3 0 0  t 1 II  Class # 3  t 1 t 9 0  t 1 t
!Class #1 t 2 t 505 t 1 ttclass #2 t 3 t 2 8 0  t 1 ttclass #3 t 3 t 9 0  t 1 t
I Class #1 t 4 t 4 9 0  t 1 IIClass #2 t 6 t 2 8 0  t 1 ttclass #3 t 1 t 9 0  t 1 t
I Class #1 t 4 t 5 0 0  t 1 ttclass #2 t 6 t 2 7 0  t 1 ttclass # 3  t 2 t 9 0  t 1 t 
I Class #1 t 5 t 5 0 0  t 1 t tclass #2 t 2 t 2 7 0  t 1 ttclass #3 t 6 t 9 0  t 1 t 
t t t 
Press Enter to Continue 
This concludes the instructions for the open auction process for allocating 
units to the market . I f  you have any questions please raise your hand at this 
time and a monitor will answer your questions . 
If you understand the instructions you can press the End key to begin our 
experiment . I f  you want a quick review of the procedures for this experiment 
press Esc . 
Overview of Experiment 
1 .  At the beginning of a period you will be given one of three possible 
Redemption Value sheets . Each sheet has an equal chance of being selected 
for you. 
2 .  There is an equal chance of 5 , 10 or 15 units being available each period 
3 .  There is an equal chance of production costs per unit being 0 , 2 0 0 ,  or 400 
francs 
OPEN AUCTION WITH PRIORITY CLASSES . 
4 .  There are three priority classes and �he capacity of each is 5 units . You 
bid for units in any and all priority classes . 
5 .  Bids are placed in unit slots for each class and bids are submitted via 
your keyboard and pressing F l .  
6 .  The auction ends if no new bids are submitted within 2 0  seconds of the 
last previous bid. 
7 .  The price that you pay for a unit equals the amount you bid for that unit 
if it is delive� 
t SEALED BID AUCTION t 
At the beginning of a period you will submit a bid for units of the 
commodity by filling out a bid form for units as described below. The bid form 
has slots for 10 bids . To fill out the bid form j ust put in your bid per unit 
and the number of units you would like at that bid (your participant number will 
already be filled in) . You are not required to bid for any units (you can 
submit a blank form) . Bids must be in whole numbers and units must be in tenths . 
Participant # Bid Per Unit 
f
f ������� ��������� 
f
± ������� ��������� 
f 
f������� 
i ��������� 
f
Number of Units 
r 
�������! ·  
r
�������! 
Press Enter to Continue or Home to go Back 
Let us fill out a form to see how this works . Suppose you are participant 
# 1 and you would l ike to submit the following bids :
5 0  francs per unit for 1 . 5  units 
40 francs per unit for 1 unit 
2 0  francs per unit for . 5  unit 
Please fill out the form below with this information . Press Enter to move from 
field to fiel d .  
Participant # Bid Per Unit Number of Units 
t 1 50 1 . 5 t
t 1 4 0  1 .  0 I
t 1 2 0  . 5 i:
t 1 i:
t 1 i:
t 1 I
t 1 t
t 1 i:
t 1 i:
f 1 
Press Enter to Continue or Home to go Back 
Let us fill out a form to see how this works .  Suppose you are part1c1pant 
# 1 and you would l ike to submit the following bids :
50 francs per unit for 1 . 5  units 
4 0  francs per unit for 1 unit 
2 0  francs per unit for . 5  unit 
Please fill out the form below with this information . Press Enter to move from 
field to field. 
Notice : Bids are per unit . Thus a 100 franc bid for 2 units is the 
same as two separate 100 franc bids for 1 unit . 
Participant # Bid Per Unit Number Of Units 
:t 1 5 0  1 . 5 i:
t 1 4 0  1 .  0 i:
t 1 2 0  0 . 5 i:
t 1 i:
t 1 i:
t 1 i:
t 1 i:
t 1 i:
t 1 i:
f 1 
Press Enter to Continue or Home to go Back 
Once you have filled out your form you must submit it to the market . Once 
all participants have submitted a bid form ALL the bids will be ranked from 
highest to lowest based on the bid per unit . For example suppose a total of 10 
bids for 16 units have been submitted and the array from highest to lowest is 
depicted in the graph below. The highest per unit bid is 8 0 0  for 2 units. Of 
course more than 1 participant could have submitted a bid of 8 0 0  for units-­
they are treated the same . 
Per unit s o o ±---
Bid in l--Francs 700 .. 
6 0 0  
5 0 0  
4 0 0  
3 0 0  
t
I 
___ _ £
k-
£--
£-
£--
£--
£--
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  11  12  13  14 15 16 
Units Bid For 
Press Enter to Continue or Home to go Back 
Youx sub1nitted Lids aLe pat: t of tl1is ariay . Suppose your bids were located 
in the array as l isted in the graph below. In this example you have submitted 3 
bids : 1 for 7 0 0  francs ; 1 . 5  for 6 0 0  francs ; 1 for 4 0 0  francs . This array will 
be used to determine the allocation of units and the price to be paid for 
the allocated units after bids are submitted. 
I 
Per Unit s o o t
Bid in 
Francs 7 0 0  
600 
500 
4 0 0  
3 0 0  
t
I ____ _ £
You have 1 unit at 7 00 
You . have 1 . 5  units at 600 
£--
£--
£--
You have 1 unit at 
400 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  1 1  12  13 14 15 16 
Units Bid For 
Press Enter to continue or Home to go Back 
After all bids have been submitted, the available supply will be posted 
on the board ( 5 ,  1 0 ,  or 15 units ) . In addition , a production cost per unit 
of capacity will be announced ( 0 ,  2 0 0 ,  or 4 0 0  francs which are equally l ikely to 
be announced) .  Units will dispersed in the following manner: 
Where the bid array "crosses" the supply capacity and the bids are greater 
than production cost per unit will determine who will be allocated units in this 
market . The price per unit for all the accepted bids will be equal to the 
highest REJECTED bid . I f  there is a tie among the lowest accepted bids so that 
units must rationed, the units will be randomly assigned to the tied bidders . 
Notice that if you have a bid accepted the price you will pay per unit will 
be no more than what you have bid. 
The price equals the "highest rej ected bid" only when greater than the per 
per production cost. I f  the production cost is greater, then the price charged 
to buyers equals this cost . 
Here are some examples to help clarify how prices and allocations will be 
determined : 
Press Enter to Continue or Home to go Back 
------<:snu�p�p�c�s�.,,--that the bid array--.iere as below ancr-supply was at 5 units wi'"" _____ _ 
a production cost of 4 0 0  francs . The supply array for this example will appear 
on your screen by pressing Enter . 
Per Unit 
Bid in 
Francs 
a o o ±---
700 k-
600 
I 
___ _ f.
500 k-
f.--
4 0 0  f.-
f.--
3 0 0  f.--
f.--
:t
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14  15 16 
Units Bid For 
Press Enter to Continue or Home to go Back 
Per Unit 
Bid in 
Francs 
Supply Array 
soo±---
700 
600 
500 
4 0 0 f  
3 0 0  
t 
Press Enter to Continue or Home to go Back 
We see that the market price is 600 francs per unit and 
the highest bids summing to 5 units are accepted with ties at 600 being 
bro]{en by--randent-aassss±i�g�nrnter��������������������������������� 
Per Unit 
Bid in 
Francs 
Market 
soo±---
700 
Supply Array 
I _f. 
t OPEN AUCTION WITH t 
t PROPORTIONAL RATIONING! 
There will be 15 units of maximal capacity available to participants . 
The allocation rule ( a fter supply is revealed) is that individuals will have 
their initial allocations "scaled" backed in proportion to the supply outcome . 
For example if you had an initial allocation of 3 units of the 15 unit maximal 
capacity and the actual supply was 10 units, then you would receive 2 units 
( 3  x 10/15 ) =  3 x 2/3 . 
The method by which you obtain your initial allocation of the 15 unit 
maximal capacity will be explained next . 
Press Enter to Continue 
You can obtain initial units by participating in an ascending price 
auction . The auction will proceed as follows at the being of a period a 
" low" price per unit will be posted . You will then be requested to submit 
an order of how many units you would l ike at that price . Suppose for example 
that an initial price of 50 francs is posted on the board as below. Participant 
then raise their hand an request units at that price . Press Enter to see what a 
list of orders would look l ike . 
Price per Unit 
50 
ID Q 
Press Enter to Continue 
Notice at this price there is an over -demand for units . That is at 
this price total requests are greater than the 15 unit maximal capacity ( 3 0  
units have been requested . Notice that at this price participant # 6 has
requested 5 units . S ince the request are greater than capacity the price will 
be increased and new orders will be requested . No allocations will be made at 
this price . 
Price per Unit ID Q 
50 1 3 
2 5 
3 10  
5 2 
6 5 
4 5 
Press Enter to Continue 
Price has now oeen 1ncreasea �o 1 �  rrancs and new reques�s nave been 
submitted . The only restriction placed on a participants new order after price 
has been increased is that your order be less than or equal to your previous 
order. At this new price we see that participant 6 has reduced his demand to 4
units and the total demand is now at 2 5  units . S ince demand is greater than the 
maximal capacity of 15 units the price will be increased . 
Price per Unit ID Q 
75 1 3 
2 5 
3 7 
5 2 
6 4
4 4
Press Enter to Continue 
Price will continue to increase as l ong as orders are larger than maximal 
capacity . The process will stop if requests equal 15 unit s .  If the current pric 
results in demand being less than 15 units price will be reduced to somewhere 
between the previous and current price . For example,  if price is raised to 100 
and demands are as below ( 14 units demanded) the next price selected would be 
between 75 an 100 . 
Price per Unit I D  Q 
100 1 2
2 3
3 2
5 2
6 1 
4 4 
Press Enter to continue 
Suppose price is now reduced to �u and demand equai i� at that price as 
l isted below. The process would stop and the price that individuals would have 
to pay for units the received would be equal to 8 0 .  In the event that a price 
cannot be found at which exactly 15 units are demanded we will take the highest 
price at which demand was less than 15 units and allocated based on those 
demands . 
Price per Unit ID Q 
8 0  1 2
2 3
3 2
5 2
6 2
4 4 
Press Enter to Continue 
When the auction stops the price will be posted along with the 
available supply ( 5 ,  1 0 ,  or 15 units) . In addition, a production cost per unit 
of capacity will be announced ( 0 ,  2 0 0 ,  or 4 0 0  francs which are equal ly likely to 
be announced) . Units will dispersed in the following manner: 
1 )  If the final price from the auction is less than the production cost no 
units will be supplied . 
2 )  If the price is greater than production cost units will be rationed 
proportionately using the scaling factor: 
scaling Factor = (Actual supply ) / 15 
The amount you receive will be equal to your request in the auction times the 
scaling factor: 
Units Received = Requested Units times Scaling Factor 
Your earnings for the period are calculated as : 
Redemption Value of Units Received - Price times Units Received 
Press Enter to Continue 
This concludes the instructions for the open auction process for allocating
�ts-t<>-the market. If ysu have any-quest-isns-�se--� -ysur-hand at-th"�i�s�----­
time and a monitor will answer your questions . 
If you understand the instructions you can press the End key to begin our 
experiment . I f  you want a quick review of the procedures for this experiment 
press Esc . 
Overview of Experiment 
1 .  At the beginning o f  a period you will be given a Redemption Value Sheet . 
2 .  The number of units to be allocated will range from O to 15 units for a
period. 
3 .  A production cost in the range of O to 4 0 0  francs per unit will be announced
at the end of each period. 
OPEN AUCTION WITH PROPORTIONAL RATIONING 
4 .  The entire capacity of 15 units will be auctioned using an increasing bid 
process .  
5 .  At each price you be ask to submit units demanded . The price will increase 
until demand and supply ( 1 5  units) "balanced" . Requests can only be decreased 
from your previous request as price is increased. 
6 .  When the process stops a production cost and supply will be announced along
with a scal ing factor. 
7 .  You only pay for the units you receive based on the scaling factor. 
I SEALED BID AUCTION - - I
I PROPORTIONAL RATIONING!
There will be 15 units of maximal capacity available to participant s .  
The allocation rule ( a fter supply i s  revealed) i s  that individuals w i l l  have 
their initial allocations " scaled" backed in proportion to the supply outcome . 
For example if you had an initial allocation of 3 units of the 15 unit maximal 
capacity and the actual supply was 10 units, then you would receive 2 units 
( 3  x 10/15 ) =  3 x 2/3 .
The method by which you obtain your initial allocation of the 15 unit 
maximal capacity will be explained next . 
Press Enter to Continue 
At the beginning of a period you will submit a bid for units of the 
commodity by filling out a bid form for units as described below . The bid form 
has slots for 1 0  bids , however you may only submit one bid, units pair. To 
enter in a bid on this form j ust type in one order (your participant number will 
already be filled in) . You are not required to bid for any units (you can 
submit a blank form) . Bids must be in whole numbers and units must be in tenths . 
Participant # Bid Per Unit Number of Units 
i t 
i ������--���������--��������-! 
i t 
i i ·
i i
i t
i t
i i
i i
f
Press Enter to Continue 
Let us fill out a form to see how this works . Suppose you are participant 
# 1 and you would l ike to submit the following bid:
5 0  francs for 1 . 5  units 
Please fill out the form below with this information . Press Enter to move from 
field to field . 
Participant # Bid Per Unit Number of Units 
f 1 5 0  1 .  5 t
f 1 t
f 1 i: 
f 1 i:
f 1 i:
f 1 t
f 1 i: 
f 1 t
f 1 i: 
f. 1
Press Enter to Continue 
Once you have filled out your form you must submit it to the market . once 
all participants have submitted a bid form ALL the bids will be ranked from 
highest to lowest based on the bid per unit . For example suppose a total of 6 
bids for 16 units have been submitted and the array from highest to lowest is 
depicted in the graph below. The highest per unit bid is 8 0 0  for 2 units . Of 
course more than 1 participant could have submitted a bid of 8 0 0  for units . 
I 
Per Unit 800f 
Bid in I _  
Francs 7 0 0  f.
! _____ _ 
600 £ 
I_ 
5 0 0  f. 
f.--
4 0 0  f.-
f.
--
3 0 0  f.--
f.--
f ----
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
Units Bid For 
Your submitted bid are part of this array . Suppose your bids were located 
in the array as l isted in the graph below. In this example you have submitted a 
bid for 1 . 5  units at a per unit price of 600 francs . This array will 
be used to determine the allocation of units and the price to be paid for 
the allocated units after bids are submitted. 
I 
Per Unit BO Of
Bid in I _
Francs 7 0 0  i 
600 
I 
____ _ i You have 1 . 5  units at 600 
500 
i--
4 0 0  
€:--
3 0 0  f.--
€:--
f 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  1 1  12 13  1 4  15 16 
Units Bid For 
The initial allocation of units to participants and the price per unit will 
be determined as follows : 
Where the bid array "crosses" the maximal supply capacity of 15 units 
determines the initial allocation of units to each participant . 
The price per unit for all the accepted bids will be equal to the 
highest REJECTED bid (the 16th highest bid) . I f  there is a tie among the lowest 
accepted bids , then the units will be randomly assigned to the tied bidders . 
Notice that if you have a bid accepted the price you will pay per unit will 
be no more than what you have bid. 
The price equals the "highest rej ected bid" only when greater than the per 
unit production cost which has an equal chance of being o ,  2 0 0  or 4 0 0  francs . 
If the production cost is greater than the 16th highest bid no one will receive 
units for that period. 
Lets work through a few examples to see how this process works . 
Suppose that the bid array were as below • S ince the auction is for 15 
units the per unit price is 4 0 0 . Press enter to see how this price was 
determined . 
Per Unit 
lSOOI
Bid in 
Francs 7 0 0  
600 f_
I ___ _ 
5 0 0  f_
f.
4 0 0  
I __ 
3 0 0  f: 
t
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18  19 2 0  
Units Bid For 
S ince the capacity is 15 units we notice that the 16 th highest bid 
resides at a value of 400 francs . All those that bid at or above will obtain 
an initial allocation of units . Press enter to continue. 
l Supply 
Per Unit S O O I
Bid in 
Francs 7 0 0  
6 0 0  f_ 
I 
500 f_
1st rejected bid 
market 
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